This paper explores the link between the leverage of the US financial sector, of households and of non-financial businesses, and real activity. We document that leverage is negatively correlated with the future growth of real activity, and positively linked to the conditional volatility of future real activity and of equity returns. The joint information in sectoral leverage series is more relevant for predicting future real activity than the information contained in any individual leverage series. Using in-sample regressions and out-of sample forecasts, we show that the predictive power of leverage is roughly comparable to that of macro and financial variables commonly used by forecasters. Leverage information would not have allowed to predict the 'Great Recession' of 2008-2009 any better than conventional macro/financial predictors.
Introduction
In the years before the recent (2007-09) financial crisis, the leverage of many major financial institutions increased steadily, and reached unprecedented levels. The crisis revealed the fragility of the financial sector, and of many highly indebted non-financial firms and households, and it has triggered the sharpest global recession since the 1930s.
Before the crisis, structural macro models largely abstracted from financial intermediaries, and macro forecasting models ignored balance sheet information. The recent dramatic events require a rethinking of the role of finance for real activity. In particular, understanding the link between balance sheet conditions and the real economy has become a key priority.
To explore that link, this paper analyzes the predictive power of leverage for GDP, industrial production, unemployment and physical investment (as well as for equity returns). Leverage is defined as the ratio of an agent/sector's assets to her net worth (assets minus debt). We use quarterly US data , and consider leverage information from the Flow of Funds, for three broad financial sectors (insurance companies, securities brokers-dealers, and commercial banks), as well as for households and for non-financial corporate businesses. We complement that information using the ratio of assets (at book-values) to the market value of equity, for financial corporations included in three Dow Jones stock price indices: 'US-Insurance', 'US-Banks' and 'USFinancial Services'. We estimate forecast equations for real activity and equity returns that use these 8 sectoral leverage ratios, and principal components of a set of 30 other macro-financial variables, as predictors. Predictive performance is evaluated using both in-sample fit and (rolling) out-of-sample forecast accuracy.
Our results show that each of our 8 leverage variables is negatively related to future real activity. This result is not driven by the recent financial crisis. The predictive power of leverage is roughly comparable to that of standard macro-financial forecast variables. Among the 8 leverage series, insurance sector leverage (from Flow of Funds), and the equity-market-value-based leverage measure for banks have the highest out-ofsample predictive ability for GDP. For forecasting real activity, it is advisable to combine the sectoral leverage information, using cross-sectional medians or principal components, instead of using the sectoral leverages series individually as predictors. Thus, the joint information in the sectoral leverage series is more relevant than the information contained in any individual sectoral leverage series. However, despite the high statistical significance of leverage (and of macro-financial factors) in the forecasting regressions, none of the variables considered here would helped in predicting the 'Great Recession' of 2008-2009. We also document that higher leverage at a given date is associated with greater uncertainty about future economic conditions. In particular, leverage is strongly positively related to the absolute value of forecast errors for future real activity (generated by our forecast equations) and to the CBOE equity market volatility index VIX (a measure of expected future stock price volatility, derived from option prices).
Furthermore, leverage is positively related to the cross-sectional dispersion (across forecasters) of predicted future real activity reported by the Philadelphia Fed's Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The link between leverage and conditional future volatility seems consistent with recent theoretical models in which higher leverage amplifies the effect of unanticipated macroeconomic and financial shocks on real activity and asset prices-the idea is that higher leverage makes the economy more fragile. The work here contributes to key recent strands in the macro-modeling and macro-policy literatures. Since the crisis, much effort has been devoted to the development of dynamic general equilibrium models with financial intermediaries; e.g., In't Veld et al. (2011) and  2 in those models, leverage is a key state variables for real activity. Our goal here is to identify robust empirical regularities about the link between leverage and real activity that can be used to evaluate those models. In the policy arena, the development of a macroprudential supervision framework (to be implemented by new agencies, such as the European Systemic Risk
Board and the US Office for Financial Research) has risen to top priority, since the crisis.
The monitoring of leverage ratios, to issue early warning indicators of crises, is likely to be a key dimension of the new framework (see Galati and Moessner (2010) ). However, our results suggest that the use of aggregate leverage information is unlikely to be a panacea for predicting crises.
Our results on the predictive content of leverage for real activity complement a recent study by who argue, based on in-sample fit, that brokersdealers (and shadow-banking) balance sheets explain future GDP. 3 We conduct a more systematic empirical exploration of the forecasting performance of leverage than these authors, by considering balance sheets for a larger number of sectors, using a broader set of controls, and evaluating both in-sample fit and out-of-sample forecast accuracy. Our approach thus seems better suited for evaluating which variables are robustly correlated with real activity. We document (inter alia) that the predictive ability of brokers-dealers is highly sample dependent, and that the joint information contained in sectoral leverage series is more relevant for future real activity than the information contained in any individual series.
4
Section 2 describes the leverage data, and Section 3 discusses our econometric methodology. Sections 4 and 5 present the results, and Section 6 concludes.
Leverage data
We construct quarterly time series on the leverage ratios of five major sectors covered by the US Flow of Funds (FoF); specifically, we consider three financial sectors-property and life-insurance insurance companies (INS), securities brokers and dealers (SBD), commercial banks (CB)-as well as households (HH) and non-financial corporate businesses (BUS). For each of these sectors, the leverage ratio is defined as: total assets/(total assets -financial liabilities). Asset and liabilities reported in the FoF are partly measured at book values, and may thus differ from market values. 5 We thus complement the FoF leverage measures using the ratios of (book-value) assets to the market value of equity, for financial companies included in three Dow Jones stock price indices (as reported by Datastream): 'US-Insurance', 'US-Banks' and 'US-Financial 3 Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010) also argue that brokers-dealers leverage predicts equity and bond returns.
4 Also, as mentioned above, we show that balance sheet information would have failed to predict the crisis, and document that leverage is strongly related to the conditional variability of real activity.
5 Deviations from market values are likely to be smallest when the balance sheets in a given sector are marked to market and/or when assets or liabilities are short term. The forecast equations for real activity discussed below are estimated on rolling windows of 40 quarters; given the lag structure of the forecast regressions, the resulting (out-of-sample) forecast evaluation period is 1993q3-2010q3. Figure 1 
Econometric methodology
We focus on one-year-ahead forecasts for real activity and equity returns. 
where Y t+4 is a measure of real activity in period t+4 (to be predicted given period t information is also included as a regressor.
We focus on the following measures of real activity: GDP, industrial production (IP), the unemployment rate (UE) and physical investment (I). Note that log leverage equals the difference between log assets and log equity. We thus also considered forecast equations in which (YoY changes of) log assets and log equity are entered separately as predictors. These specifications yield lower out-of-sample forecast accuracy than models in which log leverage is used as a predictor. We tested whether the coefficient of log equity equals the negative of the coefficient of log assets; for Flow of Funds data, we fail to reject that hypothesis-this suggests that the effect of equity and of assets on future real activity can be subsumed by leverage, consistent with regression equation (1). Hence, the subsequent analysis focuses on leverage as a predictor.
As controls ( ), t Φ we use the four principal components extracted from a set of macro-financial variables other than leverage, following Stock and Watson (2002) . We consider a set of 30 predictors (see list in Appendix) that are widely used in macroeconomic and financial forecasting: NIPA aggregates, employment, aggregate price indices, commodity prices, interest rates and the Fama-French (1993) asset pricing factors (all of these variables are properly stationarized).
We compute out-of-sample measures of forecast accuracy based on a rolling 40 quarter estimation window. As our data sets covers the period 1980q4-2010q3, the forecasts based on the rolling window pertain to 1993q3-2010q3 (taking into account the lags in (1)), as mentioned above. We also report the in-sample fit of model (1) 
Forecast model variants

Model Restrictions
Random Walk β 1 = β 2 = β 3 =0 Just ΔY β 2 = β 3 =0 F β 3 =0 F, PC-LEV Λ t =first principal
In-sample results
In-sample, models with many regressors achieve the best fit (i.e. the lowest RMSEs). For GDP, industrial production (IP), the unemployment rate (UE), and investment (I), the insample forecast regressions with the four macro-financial factors (model variant labeled 'F') generate an RMSE that is about 25%-33% smaller than that of the benchmark 'Just ΔY' model; by contrast, the macro-financial factors do not help a great deal in predicting the excess equity return. In-sample, some individual sectoral leverages too perform well. Table) . Wald tests show that, for each dependent variable, the 8 leverages are overwhelmingly jointly significant (probability value in the range of 10 -6 ).
The in-sample evidence thus suggests that there exists a highly significant, negative link between leverage and future real activity.
Rolling forecast regressions
Out-of-sample forecasting performance based on the rolling regressions is worse than insample fit (see right panel of Table 1 ). This is especially the case for models with many 
Estimated slope coefficients of leverage (rolling regressions)
The rolling regressions again show a negative link between leverage and future real activity. For each model that includes leverage as a regressor, Table 2 (right panel) reports the fraction of rolling 40 quarter estimation windows in which the estimated leverage coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level (as well as the fraction in which the slope coefficient is significant, irrespective of sign; see figures in parentheses). In the forecast equations for GDP, industrial production and investment, most slope coefficients of leverage are negative and statistically significant (consistent with this, most leverage coefficients in the forecast equations for unemployment are positive). Figure 2 which plots the GDP forecasts (rolling window based) generated by the model with the four macro-financial factors ('F'), and by 9 The estimated slope coefficients are based on forecast equations that include these predictors: a constant, the quarterly first difference of GDP, and one leverage variable the model with these four factors and the principal component of leverage ('F,PC-LEV').
Both models fail to predict the dramatic fall in GDP that during the recession-in fact, both models yield essentially the same predictions for GDP, for [2008] [2009] . Figure 2 reveals that the overall RMSE reduction produced by using leverage information mainly reflects smaller forecast errors made during the early 2000s (after the collapse of the dotcom bubble).
In summary, the in-sample and out-of-sample results suggest that leverage is a statistically significant predictor for real activity. However, quantitatively, the effect of using leverage as a predictor is modest-leverage information would not have generated an 'early warning' of the 2008-2009 recession.
Perhaps this finding should not entirely come as a surprise. Structural macro models with financial intermediaries suggest that the link between leverage and future expected real activity is ambiguous-in particular, it depends on the nature and relative importance of the shocks affecting the economy. 10 This suggests that it might be fruitful to condition on the underlying disturbances, when evaluating the empirical link between leverage and real activity--we leave an investigation of this issue for future research.
However, intuition suggests that leverage might also matter for the conditional volatility of future real activity and returns: essentially, an increase in leverage today should amplify the effect of future shocks. 11 This would imply a positive link between leverage 10 For example, in Kollmann et al.'s (2011) dynamic general equilibrium model with a banking sector, a transitory fall in total factor productivity (TFP) lowers bank leverage, on impact (as household savings and the supply of deposit fall, which leads banks to finance a larger share of their asset holdings by raising equity); the TFP shock lowers GDP, on impact, but GDP subsequently reverts to its pre-shock level. When TFP shocks are the dominant source of economic fluctuations, leverage is hence negatively correlated with future GDP growth. By contrast, the model predicts that an unexpected credit loss (a loan default shock) reduces the banks' capital (equity), on impact, and hence raises the leverage ratio; on impact the shock lowers GDP (as banks cut their lending), but subsequently GDP recovers. Hence, leverage is positively correlated with future GDP growth, when there are sizable credit losses.
and uncertainty about future economic conditions. The next Section documents that such a link does indeed exist in the data-and that it is powerful. 12
Leverage and the conditional variability of real activity and equity returns
We evaluate the link between the date t YoY change in log leverage and the following three measures of uncertainty about future economic conditions:
(i) The absolute value of date t+4 forecast errors (in %) implied by the date t forecasts generated by the forecast models discussed in the previous Section.
(ii) The CBOE equity volatility index (VIX) at the end of period t--VIX is an estimate of the future volatility of stock prices (inferred from options prices).
(iii) The measure of dispersion (in %), across forecasters, of date t forecasts for real activity growth between t and t+4, reported by the Philadelphia Fed Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). 12 Previous research has documented that the conditional volatility of real activity is time-varying (e.g. Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2008) , and Frale and Veredas (2009)). Our results about the link between leverage and future conditional volatility of real activity are novel, to the best of our knowledge. 13 The SPF dispersion measure is the % difference between the 75th and 25th percentiles of the crosssections of forecasts. Tables 4 and 5 provide regression evidence on the link between leverage and conditional future volatility/dispersion. Table 4 regresses absolute date t+4 forecast errors for each of our five dependent variables on (annual YoY changes of) our 8 sectoral log leverage variables observed at t (see first 8 rows of Table) ; we also regress absolute forecasts errors on all 8 sectoral leverage series jointly, and on the principal component and median value of (YoY changes of) sectoral log leverages. Table 4 furthermore shows results that obtain when the four macro-financial factors are added to these regressors. In Table 5 , the cross-sectional dispersion of date t SPF forecasts (for GDP, industrial production, the unemployment rate and investment; see Columns (1)- (4)), as well as the VIX at t (Col. 5) are regressed on the regressors used in Table 4 .
In almost all regressions, the slope coefficients of leverage are positive and highly statistically significant. 14 This result confirms the existence of a powerful positive link between leverage and conditional future variability/dispersion. That link is particularly strong for the leverage factor and median leverage. Each of these two leverage measures alone explains between 20% and 30% of the variances of the absolute GDP forecast errors, of SPF cross-sectional GDP forecast dispersion, and of VIX (see R 2 coefficients).
The four macro-financial factors are likewise related to future conditional volatility-but less strongly than leverage (lower R 2 s). Furthermore, the principal component and median of the sectoral leverage measures remain highly significant when the four macrofinancial factors are added as predictors.
Conclusion
This paper documents statistically significant links between leverage and future real activity, and between leverage and the conditional volatility of future real activity. These links appear particularly clearly when information from sectoral leverage series is combined using cross-sectional medians or principal components. Notes: The Flow of Funds leverage ratio for commercial banks (CB) displays a break in 1999. We corrected for this break by projecting the CB leverage ratio on a time dummy and a linear and quadratic trend, and then adjusting the raw series for the dummy coefficient. Section (c) lists the 30 variables from which the four macro-financial factors (used as predictors) are extracted (principal components). The right-most column lists the data transformations used in constructing the factors. Returns on Treasury bonds are derived from constant maturity yield curves (estimated using the methodology of Gürkaynak et al. (2007) ), as published on the web page of the Federal Reserve Board. Scatter plots of absolute forecast error for GDP (in %) between t and t+4, of Equity Volatility Index (VIX) at end of period t, and of date t cross-sectional dispersion of SPF forecasts of GDP growth between t and t+4 vs. the first principal component (of the YoY change in sectoral log) leverage between t-4 and t are shown. The forecast error pertains to forecast model 'F' (four macro-financial factors used as predictors), and is based on rolling 40 quarter estimation window. The sample period (t) is 1992q3-2009q3. '% Sign. negat. coeff. rolling windows') shows shares of leverage coefficients that are significantly smaller than zero at a 10% level (two-sided Newey-West HAC t-test), among the rolling 40 quarter estimation windows; numbers in brackets pertain to the share of estimation windows with significant leverage coefficients at 10% level (i.e. sum of share for significant negative and positive coefficients). Columns labeled 'GDP', …,'Rx' pertain to the different forecasted variables (IP: industrial production; UE: unemployment rate; I: investment; Rx: excess equity return). in parentheses) and R 2 coefficients (2 nd figure in parentheses) of regressions of absolute forecast errors for GDP, industrial production (IP), the unemployment rate (UE), gross investment (I) and the equity excess return (Rx), on the variables shown in the first column (a constant is included in all regressions). Columns labeled 'GDP', …,'Rx' indicate the respective dependent variable. P-values are based on NeweyWest HAC t-statistics. Absolute forecast errors pertains to differences between realizations at t+4 and forecasts made at t; forecasts are generated using the forecast regression referred to as 'F' in the text (based on rolling 40 quarter estimation window), i.e. the four macrofinancial factors are used as predictors. Absolute forecast errors are regressed on changes of log leverage between t-4 and t (observed at t) in parentheses) and R 2 coefficients (2 nd figure in parentheses) of: (i) regressions of the cross-sectional dispersion of date t SPF forecasts for GDP, industrial production (IP), the unemployment rate (UE) and private investment (I) at t+4 on the change of log leverage between t-4 and t; (ii) regressions of the logged CBOE equity price volatility index (VIX) at the end of period t on leverage growth between t-4 and t. P-values are based on Newey-West HAC t-statistics 
